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School districts in Ohio have the choice of two tax instruments with which to raise revenue:
the property tax and a residence-based income tax. Economic theory predicts that local
governments, if given the choice, would prefer to diversify their tax base to reduce the
political costs associated with excessive reliance on one tax. Why then, do some school
districts not utilize the income tax? This paper extends earlier work on this issue by showing
that income inequality is negatively associated with the choice of an income tax.
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School districts rely primarily on the property tax to raise local revenue. While other sources
such as income and sales taxes have increased for municipalities in recent years, local school
districts continue to generate most of their local revenue from the property tax. During
the fall 2001 school year the average U.S. school district received 78 percent of local school
district revenue from the property tax (U.S. Department of Education 2004). That represents
an increase of two percentage points since the fall 1989 school year.
Continued reliance on the property tax by school districts is curious given that the prop-
erty tax is universally considered to be the most disliked tax. From the property tax revolts
of the 1970s to the school ﬁnance reform lawsuits of the 1980s and 1990s, taxpayers con-
tinue to agitate for reduced reliance on the property tax. While property tax collections have
slowed somewhat and intergovernmental transfers have reduced reliance on the property tax,
school districts continue to rely heavily on the property tax for raising own-source revenue.
One explanation for the continued reliance on property taxes is most school districts have
no choice over tax instruments. In most states, local school districts are required by law to
use the property tax when generating local revenue. Even in states that allow school districts
to choose among tax instruments, however, local school districts continue to rely heavily on
the property tax. Ohio is one of two states (the other being Iowa) that allow school districts
to choose between a property tax and an income tax and Ohio school districts raise less than
ﬁve percent of their local revenue from school district income taxes.
Looking at the aggregate, however, loses sight of the fact that some districts rely fairly
heavily on the income tax. Wyoming City in Hamilton County raises nearly half (47.75
percent) of its local revenue from the income tax, highest in the state. Of the 607 regular
local school districts in Ohio during the fall 2001 school year, 129 of them utilized the school
district income tax to some extent, and more than 50 school districts obtain half of their
local revenue from the income tax.
Hettich and Winer (1984) suggest that local politicians have an incentive to diversify the
tax base of their government. Their argument is that the political cost of a single tax is
an increasing function of the government’s reliance on that tax. Thus it is less costly from
a politician’s perspective to diversify revenue sources across multiple tax bases. Nechyba
(1997) points out that tax bases diﬀer in their mobility. The property tax base is fairly ﬁxed
in the short run while the income tax base is fairly mobile. In Nechyba’s model, if high-
income households have free mobility then the equilibrium outcome is complete reliance on
the property tax. Local governments are unwilling to adopt an income tax because high-
income households will just move to a nearby district without an income tax. As the costs
of mobility increase (interjurisdictional competition declines) the model predicts that school
districts will begin adopting the income tax.
The unique nature of the Ohio school district income tax presents a unique opportunity
to study empirically the impact that interjurisdictional competition has on local government
choice among diﬀerent tax instruments. Spry (2005) tests Nechyba’s model using data on
Ohio school districts and ﬁnds that school districts are more likely to adopt income taxes
when interjurisdictional competition is low. This paper extends Spry’s work in two important
ways. First, a diﬀerent and more common deﬁnition of interjurisdictional competition is
utilized to check the robustness of Spry’s estimation. Second, this paper looks at the eﬀect
1of income inequality on the choice among tax instruments. If the fear is that utilizing an
income tax will cause high-income taxpayers to ﬂee to nearby districts, the higher the ratio
of mean-to-median income in a school district, the lower the probability that school district
will adopt an income tax.
2 The Ohio School District Income Tax
All Ohio school districts are required to have a property tax in order to participate in the
state foundation program, which provides intergovernmental education grants. The property
tax covers all residential, agricultural, public utility, and business property. A property tax
limitation enacted in the 1970s called House Bill 920 limits school districts to levying new
property taxes by amount, not as rates. When property values increase property tax millage
is automatically adjusted downward by the county auditors to maintain the voted-on level
of revenue. The result is that Ohio school districts have to return to the ballot for not only
new revenue but to replace the value of revenue eroded by inﬂation. As a result, school levies
are a regular occurrence in most school districts.
The Ohio school district income tax is a residence-based tax. As such, it does not tax
non-residents like the property tax. To the extent that the property tax is exported to non-
residents, therefore, a dollar raised in local revenue through the property tax is less expensive
to local residents than a dollar raised through the income tax. The tax is levied on Ohio
adjusted gross income and collected by employers and remitted to the Ohio Department of
Taxation, which process the payments for school districts. School oﬃcials do not have to
oﬀer voters the choice to adopt an income tax as a single issue; rather they can package an
increase in the income tax with a reduction in the property tax.
One advantage to replacing property tax revenue with income tax revenue is that revenue
raised through the income tax grows with inﬂation unlike revenue raised through the property
tax. To the extent that levies are politically costly for school oﬃcials, this provides another
reason for them to prefer to substitute income taxes for property taxes. Since the Ohio school
district income tax is residency-based, however, mobile high-income individuals might ﬂee as
a result of the imposition of an income tax. That might provide some explanation for why
only 129 school districts had adopted a school district income tax by the fall of 2001. Since
they can escape the tax by moving to a nearby district but yet still remain in the same job,
Spry (2005) suggests that residence-based income taxes provide a good test of Nechyba’s
(1997) hypothesis on the eﬀects of taxpayer mobility on choice of tax instruments.
3 Relevant Literature
There has been a limited amount of empirical work on the choice among tax instruments
among local governments. The tax structures of local governments have become increasingly
diverse over the last quarter-century as local governments reduce their reliance on the prop-
erty tax (Sjoquist, Wallace, and Edwards 2004). The theory of revenue instrument choice by
local governments has been addressed by Hettich and Winer (1984, 1998) who argue that the
2choice among tax instruments can be modeled either as a benevolent social planner choosing
among the appropriate instruments or as self-interested politicians. The latter model pro-
vides an explanation why departures from an economically eﬃcient tax system might be the
result of rational political decision-making, not mistakes in policy formation (Poterba 1998).
While not formally modeled here, the general theoretical framework employed is similar to
that of Hettich and Winer (1984) in that politicians attempt to minimize the political costs
of raising additional revenues. The empirical literature on choice among tax instruments
provides some useful information to help give perspective on some of the political costs and
beneﬁts facing school district oﬃcials thinking of placing a school district income tax on
the ballot. Blackley and DeBoer (1987) look at data on Indiana counties replacing property
tax revenue with an income tax and ﬁnd that the ability of a county to export its property
tax burden to non-resident property owners reduces the probability that a county will adopt
an income tax. Sjoquist (1981) ﬁnds that areas where non-residential property is a larger
percentage of the tax base rely more on the property tax. Looking at voting patterns on
a Georgia referendum to replace property taxes with sales taxes, Biegeleisen and Sjoquist
(1988) ﬁnd that precincts voting for the referendum had a large percentage of senior citizens,
higher property values, and large estimated reductions in property taxes.
In addition, there exists an enormous literature on school referenda. For example, Hicks
(1972) analyzed factors inﬂuencing school district referenda in Ohio. More recently, Romer
and Rosenthal (1982), Brokaw, Gale and Merz (1990), Romer, Rosenthal, and Munley (1992),
and Balsdon, Brunner, and Rueben (2003) have studied the issue of school district referenda.
The amount of research on referenda is large because referenda generally are assumed to
provide a good empirical test of the median voter model (Holcombe 1980). Voters only face
choice along one dimension and, given Tiebout (1956) sorting, it is reasonable to assume
single-peaked preferences. Following, this literature I assume that the median household is
the decisive voter.
4 Data and Empirical Results
The data used here come from the Ohio Department of Education, the special school district
tabulation of the 2000 Census, and the Ohio Department of Taxation. Census data were
matched to the data from the Ohio Department of Education and Department of Taxation.
Deﬁnitions and summary statistics of all variables are presented in the Appendix.
The primary variable of interest is the measure of interjurisdictional competition. As
stated earlier, Spry (2005) uses an intuitively more obvious but less conventional measure of
interjurisdictional competition. His measure is the number of districts within 10 miles of a
school district. Similar to Hoxby (2000) and others, I utilize a Herﬁndahl index to measure
the degree of market concentration a district has in the area. The Herﬁndahl index measures
the probability that two students drawn at random from a county are from diﬀerent school
districts. Formally, the Herﬁndahl index takes the form of:





where Sjm is equal to district j’s share of enrollment in county m. A county with only one
3district will have a value of 0 and a hypothetical county with a perfectly competitive Tiebout
district would equal 1 as the number of districts and students approach inﬁnity.
The other key variable is the mean-to-median income ratio. This variable is cal-
culated by taking the ratio of the mean household income in the district to the median
household income in the district. Districts with a large number of high-income households
are more likely to have a mean household income higher than the median, thus the higher
the mean-to-median income ratio, the greater the income inequality in the district. While
not perfect, given that mean and median household income is the only income data avail-
able at the school district level this is the best measure of income inequality available. It
is hypothesized that the higher the mean-to-median-income ratio, the lower the probability
that a school district utilizes an income tax, other things equal.
The other variables are the percentage of assessed property that is commercial and the
percentage of revenue from state sources. The more business property in a school district
the more the tax burden can be exported to non-residents. Districts with a larger percentage
of business property are likely to have a lower probability of utilizing an income tax. The
sign of state aid is diﬃcult to predict apriori. Districts with high levels of state aid are likely
to have few high-income taxpayers to lose from passing an income tax. On the other hand,
districts with a low percentage of state aid have to go back to the ballot box more frequently
and thus might be more likely to swap property taxes to reduce the set-up cost of having to
return to the ballot box frequently.
RHS Variables 1 2 3
Constant 0.947 * 4.510988 *** 4.506121 ***
(1.71) (4.08) (4.07)
Herfindahl Index -1.37482 *** -1.376212 *** -1.370999 ***
(2.62) (2.57) (2.55)
% Business Property -0.03602 *** -0.034439 *** -0.033204 ***
(6.46) (5.98) (5.68)
% State Revenue  0.008482 * 0.004324 0.003985
(1.87) (0.87) (0.80)
Mean to Median Income Ratio -2.833988 *** -2.571684 ***
(3.74) (3.27)
% Senior Citizen  -0.025745
(1.13)
No. of observations 607 607 607
Pseudo R
2 0.111 0.137 0.139
Absolute z-statistics in parentheses.
Table 1
Probit Results: Dependent Variable is Dummy Variable Indicating Income Tax 
Usage
4Table 1 presents the results from a binary Probit regression. The dependent variable is
a dummy variable representing 1 if the district had an income tax for the fall 2001 school
year and 0 if it did not. As can be seen, the measure of interjurisdictional competition has
the expected sign and is signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. The variable for the percentage
of total revenue from state sources is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the one percent
level in the ﬁrst regression but becomes insigniﬁcant once the mean-to-median income ratio
is introduced. The variable measuring income inequality, the mean-to-median income ratio,
has the expected negative sign and is statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Thus the
level of income inequality in a district as measured by the ratio between the mean and
median household incomes leads to less use of an income tax. Presumably, this is because
of the fear that high-income taxpayers might migrate to school districts without an income
tax. Finally, the variable for the percentage of property within the district that is business
has the expected negative sign and is signiﬁcant at the one percent level.
5 Conclusion
There exists a well-documented link between interjurisdictional competition and the choice
among tax instruments. In this paper I have conﬁrmed the results of Spry (2005) using a
diﬀerent measure of interjurisdictional competition. In addition, income inequality is shown
to play an important role in the choice of whether or not to adopt an income tax. School
districts where the mean-to-median income ratio is high are less likely to utilize an income
tax, presumably out of fear that high-income property owners will move in response.
An area of further inquiry not explored in this study is the spatial nature of interjurisdic-
tional tax competition. Following the work of Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) it is possible
that local school districts are engaging in strategic tax competition. It is likely that the
ability of a school district to pass a school district income tax is inﬂuenced substantially
by the presence of an income tax in neighboring school districts. If so, the resulting esti-
mates of Spry (2005) and this paper may be biased and spatial econometrics techniques more
appropriate.
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7Appendix
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Variable Name Definition Mean St. Dev.
Income Tax
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 




Percentage of property valuation 
in the school district classified as 
business 
32.99 14.31
% Senior Citizen  Percentage of school district 
residents 65 and older 13.38 3.407
% State Revenue  Percentage of school district 
revenue from state sources 48.01 15.32
Herfindahl Index
Degree of interjurisdictional 
competition; see text for further 
explanation
0.796 0.112
Mean to Median Income Ratio
Ratio of mean household income 
in the school district to median 
household income
1.214 0.105
8